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Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our 
language. Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953, section 109 
  
Wittgenstein’s account of how language bewitches one’s intelligence is a singular 
achievement in the phenomenology of language. In section 426 of Philosophical 
Investigations Wittgenstein famously claims that the meaning of a word is to be found 
in the “actual use” of it, and he contrasts this understanding with the projection of a 
picture: 
 
A picture is conjured up which seems to fix the sense unambiguously. The actual 
use, compared with that suggested by the picture, seems like something muddied. ... 
[T]he form of expression we use seems to have been designed for a god, who knows 
what we cannot know; he sees the whole of each of those infinite series and he sees 
into human consciousness. (Wittgenstein, 1953, section 426)  
Wittgenstein is claiming here that when one projects a picture as the meaning of a 
word, it gives one the illusion of a God’s-eye view of the word’s referent as a thing-
in-itself, an illusory clarity that one much prefers over the “muddied” view given in 
the understanding that the actual meaning of a word is to be found in its multiple and 
shifting contexts of use. When the illusory picture is then imagined as ultimately real, 
the word has become transformed into a metaphysical entity. In place of the 
“muddied” view given by contexts of use—finite, contingent, unstable, transient—one 
can imagine the clear outlines of an everlasting entity. Metaphysical illusion, 
mediated by reified pictures, replaces the finitude and transience of existence with a 
God’s-eye view of an irreducibly absolute and eternally changeless reality (Stolorow 
& Atwood, 2013). A bewitchment of intelligence by language is thereby 
accomplished, whereby one’s prereflective experience of language shapes one’s sense 
of the real (Stolorow & Atwood, 2018). In the present essay we explore a form of 
witchery aimed at forging a sense of unity from incompatible visions of reality—
namely, the formation of oxymoronic hybrids. 
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Neuropsychoanalysis (or Neurophenomenology) 
These oxymoronic hybrids are aimed at closing the gap separating incompatible 
universes of discourse—namely, the domain of natural science and the domain of 
phenomenology. The distinction between these two domains is illustrated by Merleau-
Ponty’s (1945/1962) differentiation of the “lived body” from the “corporeal body,” 
the former being a focus of phenomenological inquiry and the latter being a subject 
matter of natural science investigation. Whereas natural science studies the body and 
its parts and functions from a third-person perspective as external objects separate 
from the investigator, phenomenology investigates from a first-person perspective 
focused on the experience of the investigator.  
 
In the current Age of Scientism or what Heidegger (1954/1977) called the 
technological way of being, third-person study grounded in “objective” evidence has 
become more and more in vogue. Hence the pressure to base phenomenological 
understandings on evidence gleaned from natural-science methods. The oxymoronic 
hybrids under discussion are manifestations of this pressure, creating the illusion that 
the phenomenological insights of psychoanalysis (or of philosophical 
phenomenology) are rooted in studies of the brain—that understandings of the lived 
body depend on studies of the corporeal body. 
Intersubjective (or Relational) Self Psychology 
A rift has been growing in the contemporary culture of psychoanalysis between 
adoption of our intersubjective perspective and Kohut’s (1977) self psychology. 
Oxymorons have been appearing in the psychoanalytic literature that unite our post-
Cartesian perspective with characteristics of the Cartesian isolated mind. A good 
example of this trend is an edited volume, Intersubjective Self Psychology, recently 
reviewed by Riker (2020) in the Psychoanalytic Review. What Riker does not seem to 
notice or mention is that the title of this book manifests a rather glaring oxymoron. 
The word intersubjective here refers to the phenomenological-contextual perspective 
that we have developed over the past half-century in an effort to rethink 
psychoanalysis as a form of phenomenological inquiry (Stolorow & Atwood, 2018). 
“Self,” from this perspective, can refer only to an experience or sense of selfhood 
constituted in a particular relational context, not to a preformed entity with an 
inherent design like Kohut’s bipolar self.  
 
The theoretical language of Kohut’s self psychology reifies the experiencing of 
selfhood and transforms it into a metaphysical entity with thing-like properties. This 
theoretical self, like other metaphysical entities, is ontologically (in its being or 
intelligibility) decontextualized. It is thus a descendent of Descartes’s isolated mind. 
The oxymoronic title Intersubjective Self Psychology reflects an effort to paper over 
the incommensurability of these two meanings—self as a dimension of experiencing 
and self as a metaphysical entity. 
Phenomenological Psychopathology 
…an oxymoron that pastes together the investigation of experience with an 
objectifying psychiatric system. Beginning with its origins in the work of Karl Jaspers 
(1913/1963), phenomenological psychopathology has traditionally been an 
investigation of the experiential worlds associated with particular mental disorders or 
psychiatric entities. A particularly good example of this tradition in phenomenological 




psychopathology is provided by a recent book by Matthew Ratcliffe (2015). 
Ratcliffe’s book—and here is its highly valuable contribution—is a study of changes 
in existential feeling—shifts and disturbances in the kinds of possibility that 
experience incorporates. His particular focus is on the loss or diminution of kinds of 
possibility. One such loss that figures prominently in Ratcliffe’s analysis is the loss of 
existential hope—the loss of a sense of the future as a domain of possible meaningful 
change for the better. Ratcliffe’s analysis of the unity of existential hopelessness is 
quite elegant and very valuable. Would that he had stopped with that, rather than 
linking it with traditional psychiatric diagnosing! But he presents it to us as a 
phenomenological account of “experiences of depression.” 
 
After commenting on the inadequacy and questionable validity of psychiatry’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), Ratcliffe proceeds to use two of its categories— “major 
depressive episode” and “major depressive disorder”—as the organizing psychiatric 
framework for his studies. In Ratcliffe’s version of phenomenological 
psychopathology, “experiences of depression” appears as an uneasy oxymoron 
through which he seeks to create an illusory unity between aspects of emotional 
phenomenology and an imaginary world of Cartesian psychiatric entities. 
 
The DSM partakes of what might be called the illusion of perceptible essences 
(Stolorow & Atwood, 2017). Wittgenstein (1953) explained how such an illusion is 
constituted by the use of a single word to denote an array of items that bear a “family 
resemblance” to one another—that is, items that share some qualities but not others. 
When such items are grouped together under one word, a reified picture is created of 
an essence that each of them instantiates. The DSM will present several symptoms 
that are claimed to be characteristic of a diagnostic entity, say depression, and a 
patient—or better, the patient’s mind—is said to be afflicted with this disorder if a 
certain proportion of those symptoms are manifest. That is, people whose 
sufferings bear a family resemblance to one another become, through the reified 
picture that has been named, instantiations of a metaphysical diagnostic essence, 
a disordered Cartesian mind. 
 
The DSM is a pseudo-scientific manual for diagnosing disordered Cartesian isolated 
minds. As such, it completely overlooks the exquisite context-sensitivity and radical 
context-dependence of human emotional life and of all forms of emotional 
disturbance. Against the DSM, we (Atwood & Stolorow, 2014) have contended that 
all emotional disturbances are constituted in a context of human interrelatedness—
specifically, contexts of emotional trauma. One such traumatizing context is 
characterized by relentless invalidation of emotional experience, coupled with an 
objectification of the child as being intrinsically defective—a trauma that is readily 
repeated in the experience of being psychiatrically diagnosed. This retraumatization, 
in turn, can actually co-constitute the manifest clinical picture. Ratcliffe elaborates a 
phenomenological account of existential hopelessness that invites exploration and 
appreciation of its context-embeddedness, but he encases it in an objectifying 
psychiatric diagnostic language that negates this very embeddedness! We contend that 
this criticism holds for the field of phenomenological psychopathology in general. 
One of us (Atwood, 2011) has explored in detail the emotional contexts in which 
abyssal states occur; states that, seen through a DSM lens, are commonly regarded as 
symptoms of severe psychiatric disorder, schizophrenia for example. Such 




experiences of annihilation and nonbeing, of erasure of both selfhood and worldhood, 
originate in contexts of devastating emotional trauma. When such traumatizing 
contexts are overlooked in favor of diagnosing psychiatric disorders, such 
substantializing misattributions only deepen the fall into the abyss of nothingness. 
What a person who has succumbed to an abyssal state needs is not an objectifying 
diagnosis of a psychiatric disease but rather a context of attuned emotional dwelling. 
 
Metaphysical entities—neurological, psychiatric, and otherwise—cover up 
devastating emotional contexts, replacing the tragic finitude and transience of human 
life with a reassuring picture of encapsulated, substantialized, and enduring realities. 
A perspective on emotional trauma that is phenomenological-contextual all the way 
down, by contrast, embraces the unbearable vulnerability and context-dependence of 
human existence and guides the comportment of emotional dwelling that we have 
recommended for the therapeutic approach to emotional trauma. 
References 
American Psychiatric Association (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of 
mental disorders, 5th edition. Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing.  
Atwood, G. E. (2011). The abyss of madness. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Atwood, G. E., & Stolorow, R. D. (2014). Structures of subjectivity: Explorations in 
psychoanalytic phenomenology and contextualism, 2nd Edition. New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Heidegger, M. (1977). The question concerning technology. In The question 
concerning technology and other essays (pp. 3-35). Trans. W. Lovitt. New 
York, NY: Harper. (Original work published 1954) 
Jaspers, K. (1963). General psychopathology. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press. (Original work published 1913) 
Kohut, H. (1977). The restoration of the self. New York, NY: International 
Universities Press. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. C. Smith. New 
York, NY: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1945)  
Ratcliffe, M. (2015). Experiences of depression: A study in phenomenology. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Riker, J. (2020). Intersubjective self psychology. Psychoanalytic 
Review, 107. 197-203. 
Stolorow, R. D. & Atwood, G. E. (2013). The tragic and the metaphysical in 
philosophy and psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Review, 100, 405-421. 
Stolorow, R. D., & Atwood, G. E. (2017). The phenomenology of language and the 
metaphysicalizing of the real. Language and Psychoanalysis, 6, 4-9. 
Stolorow, R. D., & Atwood, G. E. (2018). The Power of Phenomenology: 
Psychoanalytic and Philosophical Perspectives. New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
 
